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There have been ongoing discussions within the WTO Doha Round on Trade Facilitation and 
the wider Aid for Trade agenda to assist developing countries in reducing behind-the-border 
restrictions and to help them benefit from trade reform. Our paper contributes to this debate 
by analyzing the impact of foreign aid spent on Aid for Trade and Trade Facilitation on the 
costs of trading.  In our empirical investigation, we conduct a panel data estimation for a 
sample of 99 developing countries for the period 2004-2009. Overall, we find that our aid 
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1.  Introduction 
 
As tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers have fallen in recent decades, interest in other trade 
costs  have  been  growing.  These  other  trade  costs,  for  example,  those  related  to  trade 
regulations, the trade infrastructure, distribution, or communications, can be much higher than 
traditional trade barriers. According to estimates by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), the 
total tax equivalent of “representative” trade costs for industrialized countries is 170 percent, 
whereas direct tariff and non-tariff barriers are below 10 percent. They argue that trade costs 
in  developing  countries  are  even  higher  than  in  high-income  countries.  Given  transaction 
costs in this order of magnitude, many countries, in particular developing countries, may not 
be able to take advantage of international trade. 
 
Partly as a response to this problem, the Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative has been launched in 
December 2005 at the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
Hong Kong. AfT is development assistance targeted at helping developing countries to better 
harness the benefits from international trade. It aims to harmonize and ameliorate existing 
structures of trade-related aid activities, taking into account both policy- and supply-related 
constraints  that  developing  countries  face  in  order  to  help  them  meet  the  challenges  of 
integrating into the international trading system.  
 
One major mechanism within the WTO’s AfT initiative is trade facilitation, the only one of 
the  four  “Singapore  issues”  which  is  still  being  negotiated  in  the  Doha  Round.
1  The 
international trade community had increasingly expressed concern for greater transparency, 
efficiency and standardized customs procedures of international transportation of goods. The 
core objectives of trade facilitation in a broader sense are to improve the international trade 
infrastructure, to simplify and internationally harmonize customs procedures, and to enhance 
cooperation between customs authorities and other government offices such as certifying or 
licensing bodies. The overriding aim is to reduce transaction costs in international trade. 
 
As a consequence, aid directed towards trade facilitation measures (Aid for Trade Facilitation, 
AfTF) has become a key element of the broader AfT initiative. It not only defines new trading 
rules  but  also  involves  the  provision  of  resources  to  assist  developing  countries  to  better 
                                                 
1 Besides trade facilitation, the “Singapore issues” comprise competition policy, foreign direct investment and 
government procurement.   3 
integrate into the world trading system and in meeting the new obligations that are expected 
to arise from a WTO trade facilitation agreement.  
 
The amount of foreign aid involved is by no means small. Between 2002 and 2008, donors’ 
total Aid for Trade disbursements amounted on average to 19.3 billion US$ (constant 2008 
prices),  a  share  of  around  one  third  of  sector  allocable  Official  Development  Assistance 
(ODA) (OECD 2010). Up to and during the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 
2005, donors pledged to increase AfT. The European Commission and EU Member States 
pledged an additional 2 billion Euros a year by 2010, the United States promised to double aid 
to 2.7 billion US$ by the same year, and Japan pledged to provide 10 billion US$ over 3 years 
(OECD and WTO 2007). According to the OECD and the WTO (2009), donors are on track 
to meet or have already met their pledges. Furthermore, it can be expected that the relative 
share of AfT in overall ODA is going to increase over the medium term.  
 
Given  that  trade  costs  matter  and  that  considerable  aid  resources  have  been  or  will  be 
provided in the  years to come, it is not surprising that there is  a  growing interest in the 
effectiveness  of  the  AfT  initiative.  Previous  empirical  studies  on  AfT  and  AfTF  can  be 
divided  into  two  strands  of  literature.  The  first  one  consists  of  a  number  of  studies  that 
investigate the impact of either trade costs or trade facilitation on trade flows. Using various 
empirical  techniques,  such  as  cross-country  econometric  analysis,  computable  general 
equilibrium (CGE) models, and country case studies, most of these studies find that both trade 
costs  and  trade  facilitation  are  important  determinants  of  trade  flows  –  with  trade  costs 
reducing them noticeably.
2 The second strand of literature focuses on the effects of AfT and 
AfTF on trade flows. Again, the studies usually find that resources spent on AfT and AfTF 
increase trade flows in recipient countries to a considerable degree.
3 Similar to the previous 
strand, the different papers use either case studies and/or econometric studies to assess the 
impact of AfT and AfTF on exports and imports. 
 
This paper combines the two strands by empirically examining the impact of AfT and AfTF 
on trade costs. We argue that Aid for Trade can be a powerful and effective tool to lower trade 
costs in developing countries and thus to increase trade flows. We also investigate the impact 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Limao and Venebles (2001), Wilson et al. (2003), Walkenhorst and Yasui (2005), Blonigen 
and Wilson (2008), Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2008), Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2007, 2009), Freund and Rocha 
(2010), and Djankov et al. (2010).  
3 See Nelson and Silva (2008), Brenton and Uexkull (2009), Helble et al. (2009), and Lederman et al. (2010).   4 
of Aid for Trade on the time of trading.
4 Apart from the impact of Aid for Trade on trade 
costs and the time of trading, our analysis also matters with respect to the aid effectiveness 
debate. Since donors try to increase the effectiveness of aid resources spent and the funds 
involved  are  relatively  large,  we  address  a  highly  relevant  policy  issue  in  our  empirical 
investigation. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we explain the research design. To 
begin with, we introduce the set of dependent variables measuring the cost and time to trade. 
Then, we explain the choice of the three aid variables used, ranging from total AfT to more 
specific aid categories such as Trade Policies and Regulations and Trade Facilitation. We use 
a large panel dataset for almost 100 developing countries and up to six years of data (2004-
2009). Section 3 embraces the empirical results. We find that aid for trade reduces trade costs 
and that the effect is of economic significance. However, the impact depends on the particular 
aid category. For the time of trading, the evidence is less robust, but still some evidence of a 
reduction in the time of trading due to our aid measures can be found. The paper concludes 
with some policy implications in Section 4. 
 
 




As  dependent  variables,  we  deploy  developing  countries’  cost  and  time  of  trading.  Our 
variables  are  taken  from  a  sub-indicator  in  the  World  Bank’s  (2010a)  Doing  Business 
Database, that is, Trading across Borders. For this sub-indicator, the World Bank collects 
information on the costs as well as the time to complete all procedures to import or export a 
standardized  product.
5  The  information  has  been  provided  by  local  freight  forwarders, 
shipping lines, customs brokers, port officials and banks. Importantly, for importing goods 
time and cost are measured from the vessel’s arrival at the port of entry to the cargo’s delivery 
at  the  warehouse.  For  exporting  goods,  procedures  range  from  packing  the  goods  at  the 
                                                 
4 A recent study by Djankov et al. (2010) shows that the time of trading has a significant impact on the trade 
volume.  
5 Apart from cost and time, the World Bank also collects data on the number of documents required to export 
and import. We focus on cost and time, as the number of documents in fact is included in the cost measure. See 
World Bank (2010a) for details.   5 
warehouse to their departure from the port of exit. In order to be able to compare the data 
across countries, quite strong assumptions are used concerning the business and the traded 
goods,  rendering  the  corresponding  trade  costs  rather  hypothetical  costs.
6  However,  we 
consider real trade costs to be highly correlated with these surveyed theoretical trade costs. 
Furthermore, by using data referring to costs of containerized trade, we actually capture a 
good deal of total trade costs. Another advantage of the Trading across Borders cost and time 
measures is that ocean transport is not included. Thus, the variables used are adequate for an 
analysis of Aid for Trade in a particular country. 
 
For trade costs, we compute real cost to export or import (labeled CostExp and CostImp, 
respectively) using nominal figures that are deflated by the US Consumer Price Index. Both 
variables measure the fees levied on a 20-foot container in US$. All fees associated with 
completing the procedures to export or import the goods are incorporated, such as costs for 
documents and customs clearance, terminal handling charges and inland transport. The cost 
measure does not include tariffs or trade taxes. Only official costs are recorded. On the other 
hand, time to export or import (TimeExp and TimeImp, respectively) measure (in days) the 
time necessary to comply with all procedures required to export/import goods.  
 
Although  CostExp  and  CostImp  are  highly  correlated,  we  find  differences  in  the  factors 
influencing  both  cost  variables  in  the  subsequent  analysis.  This  justifies  the  use  of  both 
dependent variables separately rather than relying on an aggregate cost of trade variable or 
reporting only one of both. The same argument holds for both time measures. 
 
The analysis covers the period 2004-2009
7. The period under consideration is restricted by 
information  for  our  dependent  variables  which  is  unavailable  before  2005.  In  order  to 
preclude any asymmetric effects, countries that have a population of less than one million 
people  (as  of  2009)  have  been  excluded  from  the  sample.  Moreover,  countries  with 
insufficient data on one or more of the control variables, such as Belarus, Cuba or Timor-
                                                 
6 For example, the business is medium-sized, trading a product that travels in a dry cargo, 20-foot, full container 
load. It weighs 10 tons, is valued at $20,000, and shipped to or from the country’s largest overseas trading 
partner through the main port. See World Bank (2010a) for more information.  
7 The sub-indicator time of trading is available for the period 2005-2009, the cost of trading indicator only for 
the period 2006-2009.   6 
Leste,  have  been  left  out  too.  That  leaves  us  with  a  sample  of  99  developing  countries, 
including 33 Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
8 
 
Main Independent Variables 
 
According to the WTO (2006), AfT consists of a number of heterogeneous trade-related aid 
categories, such as trade policies and adjustment measures and supply-side related categories 
like infrastructure, capacity building and development (Figure 1). In our analysis, we focus on 
total  AfT  as  our  broadest  measure  and  two  of  its  subcategories,  Trade  Policies  and 
Regulations and Trade Facilitation (white areas in Figure 1). As both subcategories deal with 
more  specific  trade  facilitation  issues  than  total  AfT,  we  expect  a  stronger  effect  on  our 
dependent variables. 
 
Figure 1: Aid for Trade Categories  
 
Note: Trade-Related Adjustment is an individual category according to the WTO definition on Aid for Trade; 
however, in reporting, it falls in the category Trade Policies and Regulations. The same holds for Trade 
Development which is subsumed in the category Building Productive Capacity in the OECD CRS.  
Source: Own illustration, based on WTO (2006) and OECD (2010). 
 
Data for our aid variables is taken from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) (OECD 
2010) which provides disaggregated data for Aid for Trade activities and is considered the 
prominent aid activity database.
9 Our first variable, AfT, measures all ODA directed towards 
Aid for Trade, consisting of all six AfT categories. The second variable, TradePolicy, draws 
upon the subcategory Trade Policies and Regulations, covering trade issues that have a more 
                                                 
8 All countries included in the analysis are listed in Appendix C1.  
9 The completeness (coverage ratio) of our data is over 90 percent since 2002 and reached nearly 100 percent 
starting with 2007 flows (OECD 2010).   7 
decisive  effect  on  how  exports  and  imports  are  administrated,  such  as  trade  policy  and 
negotiations, training, and trade facilitation.
10 It amounts to 673 million US$ on average per 
year (constant 2008 prices), which is 3.5 percent of AfT (OECD 2010). Our hypothesis is that 
such specific trade-related development funding is not necessarily plagued by  general aid 
effectiveness concerns. There is less heterogeneity of aid channels and motives, and we may 
avoid generic statements on how aid impacts trade. Our analysis is thus detached from the 
aid-trade or aid-growth nexus dealt with in the literature.  
 
For our third aid variable, TradeFacilitation, we separate out even more specific aid flows 
directly related to improving the cost- and time-efficiency of trading. It comprises all ODA 
directed towards Trade Facilitation, a subcategory of Trade Policies and Regulations, which is 
recorded at the lowest possible level of AfT and amounts to around 88 million US$ per year 
(in constant 2008 prices) (OECD 2010). It aims at lowering trade transaction costs, including 
the  simplification  and  harmonization  of  international  import  and  export  procedures  (e.g., 
customs valuation, licensing procedures, transport formalities, payments, and insurance), the 
support to customs departments and tariff reforms. Thus, we use a quite narrow definition of 
what belongs to AfTF. 
 
All three aid variables refer to disbursements and are given in million US$ at constant 2008 
prices.
11 They are accumulated to not only measure a country’s current received aid, but to 
account for aid flows in previous years which may also impact our response variables. We 
believe that resources spent on aid for trade have a lasting effect; they not only reduce trade 
costs for one year but may cause a permanent reduction in trade costs. The trade costs of any 
given  year  reflect  the  outcome  of  aid  flows  of  all  previous  years  together.  By  taking 
accumulated aid flows, or so to speak the “stock” of aid spent, we adequately account for this 
dependency of trade costs on aid, and furthermore provide for equivalence to our cost and 
time measures (which are also stock variables)
12 
                                                 
10 Trade Policies and Regulation is combined with Trade-Related Adjustment in the CRS database as of 2008. 
Flows going to the category Trade-Related Adjustment are marginal so far and therefore excluded. 
11 All other variables that are measured in nominal US dollars are adjusted for inflation too. See Appendix A for 
data sources. Descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix B. 
12 We only accumulate aid flows spent during the period 2004-2009, as we only consider changes in trade costs 
during that period. Using a horizon wider than 2004-2009 does not make sense from an econometrical 
perspective as in a fixed effects estimation increasing all observations of one country by the same amount (aid 
spent before 2004) does not change the estimation results. Since there are quite a few missing observations in the 
data, we consider a second variant of our TradeFacilitation variable where we fill up all missing observations 
with zeros. It is possible that the missing data are in fact zeros, as we consider a very specific category over 
several years. Also, by including zeros we may avoid sample selection bias. Both versions deliver almost   8 
 
Other Control Variables 
 
Needless to say, the cost and time of trading are influenced by other factors too. As the first 
control  variable,  we  use  (real)  GDP  per  capita  (GDPpc).  A  higher  per-capita  income  is 
associated  with  a  better  trade  infrastructure  and  less  behind-the-border  restrictions,  which 
should lower cost and time of trading. However, per-capita income is also linked to labor 
costs, which impact trade costs positively. Thus, for GDPpc we expect an ambiguous impact 
on trade costs but a positive association with time to trade.  
 
Next, we include the (real) value of merchandise exports plus imports (Trade). More trade is 
linked to higher efficiency in transport and customs procedures and thus lower costs. The 
more imports and exports, the easier a country may realize economies of scale in trading 
through learning processes, more effective use of customs and administrative cost savings. 
The same logic applies to the time of trading. However, large increases in trade volume may 
lead to congestions effects at ports and/or borders (in the short run) and prolong the trading 
time. The impact of Trade on both time variables is therefore uncertain a priori. 
 
We also control for the regulatory quality (RegQuality), proxied by the World Bank Good 
Governance  measure  on  the  quality  of  regulations  in  a  country.  This  perception-based 
indicator measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. The better the national 
administration – as a proxy for government regulations in the transport sector – the lower the 
cost and time of trading. Conversely, red tape and inefficient government regulations may 
drive up trading costs and time. Since a higher value of RegQuality corresponds to better 
governance  outcomes,  we  expect  a  negative  association  with  our  trade  cost  and  time 
measures.  
 
The  last  control  variable  refers  to  the  local  pump  price  for  diesel  fuel  in  US$  per  liter 
(FuelPrice). It is considered a determinant of trade costs as inland transportation and handling 
partly rely on motorized vehicles running on fuel. We use this indicator in the trade costs 
regressions only and expect a negative impact on both cost variables. 
                                                                                                                                                          
identical results concerning the size and the sign of the coefficients. For practical reasons, we fill up the flow 




We estimate a fixed-effects model to control for other non-observed country-specific effects. 
The specification of our model reads as follows: 
 
it t it it it YEAR X AID COST ε λ β β + + + − −     +   '   = 1 1 1 i                                                                    (1) 
 
where the dependent variable  it COST  stands for either cost (or time) of trading of country i in 
period  t  and 1 − it AID   being  the  main  variable  of  interest  (AfT,  TradePolicy  or 
TradeFacilitation).  i β  represents the country fixed-effect and  1 − it X  is a set of other control 
variables that includes GDP per capita (GDPpc), the value of merchandise trade (Trade), 
regulatory  quality  (RegQuality)  and,  in  the  cost  regression,  the  cost  of  fuel  (FuelPrice). 
t YEAR  is a full set of time dummies which is supposed to capture period specific effects and 
changes in the time and cost of trading over time. εit stands for the error term. 
 
Partly to mitigate potential reverse causality problems, all explanatory variables enter our 
model lagged by one year. Preferably, one would like to deal with this potential problem more 
comprehensively  with  the  help  of  an  instrumental  variable  approach.  However,  further 
explanatory variables, such as regulatory quality, are potentially subject to reverse causality, 
and it would be simply impossible to find both adequate and valid instruments.  
 
There  is  another  reason  why  reverse  causality  is  not  likely  to  influence  our  results.  As 
explained above, we use highly specific aid categories in our empirical investigation with 
relatively  small  amounts  of  aid.  As  a  share  of  total  sector  allocable  ODA  (2002-2008 
average), Trade Policy and Trade Facilitation amount to some 1 percent and 0.14 percent, 
respectively. Given these small shares, costs and the time of trading are not very likely to 
have an impact on aid flows. However, this argument is less convincing for AfT (around one 
third of total sector allocable ODA). For this variable, using lags will mitigate the potential 
reverse causality problem. 
 
There are two further reasons why we use lagged independent variables. First, we expect time 
lags between aid and its effect on time and costs of trading. If a developing country receives   10 
more aid or improves its regulatory quality in a particular year, changes in the cost and time 
of  trading  are  more  likely  to  take  effect  in  the  following  year,  as  it  takes  some  time  to 
implement changes in laws and regulations. Second, there are different reporting periods in 
the  data:  The  Doing  Business  Report  publishes  data  on  the  cost  and  time  of  trading  in 
September of each year, collecting data in the months before. Aid data, on the other hand, is 
annual data referring to the calendar year. 
 
To check for the robustness of our results, we took the natural logarithm of both dependent 
and independent variables (log model) as well as of the independent variables only (semi-log 
model). Using a log or semi-log model would particularly make sense if we wanted to reduce 
very high variations in the data or considered our model as non-linear. Neither is the case, so 
all our variables enter in levels eventually. 
 
 
3.  Empirical Results  
 
Following the model specification and the introduction of the variables, we now turn to the 
empirical results. We start with the determinants of trade costs, include all control variables 
and  add  the  three  different  aid  variables  separately  (Table  1).  As  dependent  variable,  we 
alternately use cost to export (CostExp) and cost to import (CostImp). The fuel price variable 
is added in a further regression, since the respective samples decline by two countries and 
eight observations when FuelPrice is included. 
 
In  line  with  our  expectations,  the  coefficient  for  the  measure  of  regulatory  quality 
(RegQuality) is negative and significant at the 10 percent level in all regressions that explain 
cost  to  export.
13  The  export  sector  seems  to  be  actually  benefiting  from  governments’ 
improved trade regulations while we do not find any influence on the cost to import.  
 
For GDPpc and FuelPrice, we do not obtain any significant results. For per-capita income 
levels this result is hardly surprising, given the ambiguous impact of both labor costs and the 
                                                 
13  We  also  test  other  political  variables  such  as  bureaucratic  quality  and  control  of  corruption  from  the 
International  Country  Risk  Guide  (2009)  and  government  effectiveness  (World  Bank  2010c).  We  find  a 
negative,  mostly significant influence  for bureaucratic quality and  government effectiveness –  which  yields 
analogous interpretations as RegQuality. Like all other unreported results, they can be obtained from the authors 
upon request.   11 
trade infrastructure on trade costs. Including the cost of fuel as an additional determinant of 
trade costs only marginally changes the values of our aid coefficients. Fuel as a cost factor 
should lead to higher trading costs; however, fuel prices are often subject to administrative 
regulations.  Even  though  the  oil  price  on  the  world  market  is  highly  volatile,  in  some 
countries fuel prices are “administrative prices”. The government fixes fuel prices with no or 
slow adjustments to changing world market prices. In our sample, in some countries there is 
no or too little variation in fuel prices to explain changing trade costs.   
 
For Trade, we also do not find significant results. The exceptions are the two regressions for 
total AfT and cost to import (columns 3 and 4). Here, the Trade coefficient is positive and 
significant while the aid variable AfT is negative and highly significant. Excluding the trade 
variable  does  not  change  the  results  for  the  aid  variable  (results  not  shown).  In  contrast, 
excluding  the  aid  variable  renders  Trade  not  significant,  suggesting  a  unidirectional 
collinearity problem between Trade and AfT. As a robustness check for Trade, we include the 
value of exports and imports separately and trade as a share of GDP. We do not detect a 
different influence on cost to export/import than for the value of total trade. 
 
Turning to our aid variables, we obtain – as already mentioned in the previous paragraph – 
negative and highly significant coefficients (at the 1 percent level) for the AfT variable in the 
cost to import regressions (columns 3 and 4). The more specific aid variable TradePolicy 
(columns 5 to 8) always yields negative and significant coefficients (at the 10 percent level or 
better).  What  is  more,  the  coefficient  of  the  most  precise  aid  variable  TradeFacilitation 
(columns 9 to 12) has the expected negative sign and is highly significant (at the 1 percent 
level).
14 These results indicate that aid for trade, in particular if highly targeted, can have a 
significant impact on the costs of trading. 
 
Apart  from  statistical  significance,  the  quantitative  effect  of  the  three  aid  measures  is  of 
economic significance too. Taking the estimated coefficient on TradeFacilitation and cost to 
import as the dependent variable (-7.314) at face value, an increase in aid by 2.89 million US$ 
(that is, one standard deviation of TradeFacilitation) would lead – on average – to a decrease 
in the cost of importing a 20-foot container by some 21.13 US$. With an average cost to 
import in our sample of 1,723 US$ this corresponds to a reduction of 1.2 percent. For AfT 
                                                 
14 While the samples of AfT and TradePolicy comprise all 99 countries, the TradeFacilitation sample is restricted 
to 85 countries due to missing or insufficient observations for the remaining 14 countries.   12 
(TradePolicy) an increase by one standard deviation decreases the cost of importing by 73.69 
US$  (84.94  US$)  which  corresponds  to  a  reduction  of  import  costs  by  4.3  percent  (4.9 
percent).  In contrast to the respective percentage changes, we observe a higher impact per 
dollar spent for our two specific aid measures in comparison to total Aid for Trade.  
 
If we apply these estimates to the number of containers traded in developing countries, the 
economic  (and  financial)  significance  of  Aid  for  Trade  increases  even  further.  In  2008, 
containerized trade received by developing economies was approximately 68 million twenty 
feet equivalent units (TEUs).
15 Increasing resources spent on the broadest measure AfT by one 
standard deviation reduces cost of exporting or importing one container by 73.69 US$ on 
average, as explained in the previous paragraph. This causes a total reduction of trade costs in 
developing economies by some 5 billion US$. 
 
Based on these results, we can (roughly) estimate the impact of our aid measures on trade 
flows.  According  to  estimates  by  Limão  and  Venables  (2001),  who  analyze  the  negative 
effects of transport costs on trade, the elasticities for trade volumes with respect to trade costs 
range  from  -2.0  to  -3.5.
16  Assuming  similar  elasticities  for  our  trade  cost  measures,  for 
TradeFacilitation we find that reducing trade costs by 1.5 percent leads to an increase in trade 
volumes in the range of 3 to 8.75 percent. Taking into account that these aid flows are very 
specific and in volume rather exiguous, their impact can be considered substantial.  
 
Finally, the overall fit of the cost estimations as measured by the R
2 is between 0.16 and 0.22. 
Given the heterogeneous country sample and the short period of time, a better fit was hardly 
to be expected.  
 
                                                 
15 According to UNCTAD (2009b), in 2008 world total of containerized trade was estimated at 137 million 
TEUs. 49.7 per cent of global seaborne imports were received by developing economies. As a rough 
approximation, 68 million TEUs were received by developing economies. Since our sample consists of 99 
developing countries including all large developing countries, such as China, India and Brazil, we are covering 
almost all developing countries trade flows. 
16 While Limão and Venables use the cost of shipping a standard 40-foot container, our trade cost measure refers 
to a 20-foot container. Also, their variable includes ocean transport and excludes insurance. They find that land 
transport in comparison to ocean transport is around seven times more costly per unit distance. Still, we think 
that using their elasticities is appropriate for our calculations of the impact on trade flows.      13 
Table 1: Aid for Trade and the Costs of Trading  
Dependent variables 
CostExp  CostImp  CostExp  CostImp  CostExp  CostImp 
 
Independent 
variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
















































FuelPrice (t-1)    71.95 
(0.651)    -38.09 
(-0.271)    90.45 
(0.805)    -53.45 
(-0.366)    42.37 
(0.297)    -26.97 
(-0.162) 































(-3.403)                 







(-3.195)         
TradeFacilitation  








Observations  396  388  396  388  391  383  391  383  326  318  326  318 
Countries  99  97  99  97  99  97  99  97  85  83  85  83 
R
2  0.16  0.16  0.22  0.21  0.17  0.17  0.21  0.21  0.17  0.17  0.19  0.18 
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; t-values, reported in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity; constant term 
and time dummies not shown. 
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In addition to the two trade cost variables, we also look at time to export (TimeExp) and time 
to import (TimeImp). The results for both additional dependent variables are shown in Table 
2. In all six time regressions, the strongest results can be found for regulatory quality, for 
which we always obtain a negative and significant coefficient at the 10 percent level or better. 
The effect is of sizable dimension too. For the estimate reported in column 3 (-7.09), for 
example, an increase in RegQuality by one standard deviation (0.603) decreases the time to 
export by 4.27 days. Given a mean of 31.67 for TimeExp, this result matters not only in terms 
of percentage changes (-13.5 percent), it has an impact on trade flows as well. According to 
estimates by Djankov et al. (2010), each additional day that a product is delayed prior to being 
shipped reduces trade by more than 1 percent. They show that the effect is even larger for 
time-sensitive agricultural and manufacturing products. Hence, the regulatory framework can 
be an important obstacle for trade flows in developing countries. 
 
For the other two control variables, we find significant albeit small positive effects for GDPpc 
(in some regressions) and for Trade (in all regressions). A positive coefficient for Trade may 
indicate that congestion effects at ports and/or borders are more relevant in the short run than 
the potential efficiency gains from a higher trade volume in the long run. Yet the coefficients’ 
size reveals that this effect is statistically significant, but economically negligible.  
 
As for the three aid variables, we find that the results with time as dependent variable are less 
distinguished than for costs. Although the coefficients of all aid variables are negative as 
expected, only the coefficient for TradePolicy on TimeExp is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level (column 3). But even if we use this estimate, the quantitative impact of an 
increase  in  TradePolicy  is  less  pronounced  as  compared  to  RegQuality.  An  increase  in 
TradePolicy by one standard deviation (26.29) decreases the time to export by 0.57 days, 
which is a much lower figure in comparison to an improvement in the quality of regulations.  
 
Overall, the aid variables’ main objective is to make trade more cost-efficient. Reducing the 
time for trading is one (important) channel by which trade costs can be lowered. However, we 
cannot observe this correlation in our results. The effect of the aid variables on reducing costs 
might be through channels other than the time of trading (e.g., the improvement of more 
direct measures like fees, more efficient bureaucratic procedures or a reduction in uncertainty 
and corruption). 
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Table 2: Aid for Trade and the Time of Trading 
Dependent variables 
TimeExp  TimeImp  TimeExp  TimeImp  TimeExp  TimeImp 
 
Independent 
variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 




































AfT (t-1)  -0.00120 
(-1.131) 
-0.00225 
(-1.351)         
TradePolicy (t-1)      -0.0219** 
(-2.400) 
-0.0346 
(-1.383)     
TradeFacilitation  




Observations  487  487  478  478  375  375 
Countries  99  99  99  99  85  85 
R
2  0.30  0.32  0.31  0.33  0.32  0.37 
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; see Table 1 for further 
notes. 
 
Next,  we  return  to  trade  costs  as  dependent  variables  and  split  the  sample  into  different 
country groupings. We would like to know if the influence of the three aid variables on the 
cost  of  trading  changes  if  we  focus  on  several  subsamples.  We  rely  on  the  same  model 
specification as in Table 1, that is, including fuel costs, but only report the coefficients (and t-
values) for the three aid variables in view of space constraints. The results for the three aid 
variables are reported in columns rather than rows, that is, AfT in columns 1 (CostExp) and 2 
(CostImp), TradePolicy in columns 3 and 4, and TradeFacilitation in columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 3.  To facilitate comparison, the main results from Table 1 are listed again in the first 
row of Table 3.   
 
First, we split the sample and replicate the analysis for LDCs and non-LDCs. In fact, LDCs 
are the main target group of Aid for Trade. Average trade costs in LDCs are considerably 
higher than in non-LDCs (1,805 versus 1,260 US$ for cost to export and 2,246 versus 1,453 
US$ for cost to import, respectively). In the reduced LDC sample, reported in the second row, 
none of the aid coefficients has a significant effect on the cost of trading. In the sample of 
non-LDC countries, on the other hand, all aid variables are highly significant (at the 1 percent 
level) and increase both in size and significance level in comparison with the benchmark   16 
regressions.  Only  the  AfT  coefficient  on  the  cost  to  export  is  not  significant  (as  in  the 
benchmark regression).  
 
Interpreting these results, one might be tempted to conclude that aid effectiveness in LDCs is 
lower or even nonexistent (UNCTAD 2008). Reasons for this are partly seen in absorption 
capacity constraints. However, looking at our data, we observe that aid flows to LDCs are 
lower on average in all three categories. For instance, average Trade Facilitation flows to 
LDCs amounted to 0.6 million US$ in 2008, compared to 1.56 million US$ for non-LDCs. 
Apart from absorption capacity constraints, we argue that very low aid flows are too marginal 
to show any influence on the cost of trading. Accordingly, our hypothesis is that aid flows 
only become effective when they reach a certain (threshold) level.  
 
To verify this hypothesis for our three aid categories, we rank all recipient countries by the 
cumulative amount of aid they have received between 2005 and 2008. We use these rankings 
to split the sample in different subsamples to compare the results for the group of the top 
recipients with the bottom group. In 2008 the top 20 recipients of TradeFacilitation have 
received 1.72 million US$ on average while the remaining countries have only received 1.09 
million  US$.  In  row  4  we  report  the  results  for  the  top  20  recipients  of  the  three  aid 
categories; in row 5 we have excluded the top 20 recipients.
17 For the sample of the top aid 
recipients we find a strong influence of aid on the costs variables (at the 1 or 5 percent level). 
Excluding those top recipients from the sample leaves us without significant effect of the aid 
variables on costs.
18 Hence, there is strong evidence that the effect of aid on trade costs is 
dominated by those countries receiving above-average aid. It seems that – on average – only 
larger development projects are successful in reducing trade costs. 
 
                                                 
17 The sample consists of 63 countries (rank 21-83) for TradeFacilitation and of 77 countries rank (21-97) for 
AfT and TradePolicy. To avoid arbitrary choices different subsamples have been considered (e.g., top 20, 25, 30 
up to the top 60 recipients). In all cases we obtain negative and significant coefficients for the aid variables. In 
the subsamples with the second largest aid recipients (e.g., top 21-40 (rank 21-40), top 26-50 and so on) we do 
not  find  any  significant  results.  Our  significant  results  seem  to  be  mainly  driven  by  the  top  20  or  top  25 
recipients of aid. 
18  We  also  check  for  influences  arising  from  other  country  clusters.  Comparing  low-income  countries  and 
middle-income  countries,  we  detect  similar  results  as  for  LDCs  and  non-LDCs  although  with  smaller 
coefficients.    17 
Table 3: Robustness Checks and Extensions 
AfT (t-1)  TradePolicy (t-1)  TradeFacilitation (t-1) 
CostExp  CostImp  CostExp  CostImp  CostExp  CostImp 
Sample  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Benchmark (as 

































































Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; only main variables of 




4.  Conclusion 
 
As direct border restrictions to trade have been or are being eliminated by many developing 
countries,  it  is  becoming  obvious  that  integrating  into  the  world  economy  increasingly 
depends on eliminating behind-the-border restrictions and investing in ports and roads. Trade 
Facilitation  and  the  wider  Aid  for  Trade  agenda  deal  with  these  topics  and  set  the 
preconditions  for  countries  to  enhance  their  international  competitiveness  and  lower  their 
transactions costs. This paper establishes the crucial link between different aid measures and 
the cost and time of trading.  
 
High trade costs are often seen as an obstacle to development led by opening up to trade. It is 
intuitive  that  trade-related  development  assistance  should  lead  to  more  cost-  and  time-
efficient trade procedures in the countries concerned. Our results indeed confirm that AfT and 
AfTF  may  lower  trade  costs  and  therefore  play  an  important  role  in  helping  developing 
countries to benefit from trade. Importantly, the impact is not only significant in statistical 
terms. We find that the effects are of economic significance as well. Aid spent on Trade 
Policies and Regulations and particularly, on Trade Facilitation, have a leverage effect on 
trade – the comparatively small aid figures may cause quite large trade volume increases. For   18 
the time of trading as our second dependent variable, the evidence is less robust, but we find 
some evidence of a reduction in the time of trading due to aid used to improve trade policies. 
 
However, we do not find significant results for the sample of LDCs. We argue that this is not 
necessarily due to LDC-inherent disadvantages but may also be caused by relatively low aid 
flows  to  these  countries.  We  find  that  the  Top  20  aid  recipients  in  all  three  categories 
dominate  the  effect  on  trade  costs.  It  seems  that  lowering  transaction  costs  requires  a 
considerable amount of aid per country. Based on these results, LDCs should receive more 
(and well-targeted) trade-related aid, given that they are in the focus of the Aid for Trade 
agenda. 
 
Our results also support the conclusion that the government’s effective ruling and putting up 
regulations  is  paramount  for  bringing  down  the  cost  and  time  of  trading.  Both  our  aid 
measures and regulatory quality independently affect the cost and time of trading negatively. 
For explaining the time of trading, only regulatory quality seems to be important, while for 
explaining  trade  cost,  both  the  aid  measures  and  regulatory  quality  seem  to  be  decisive. 
Improvements  in  the  level  of  regulatory  quality,  however,  are  only  effective  in  reducing 
export costs. Efforts to enhance government regulative powers and institutional quality in 
developing countries thus should go along with foreign support to further development.  
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable  Definition  Data source 
AfT  Cumulative Aid for Trade, gross disbursements (constant 
2008 US$ million).  OECD (2010) 
TradePolicy  Cumulative Aid for Trade Policies and Regulations, gross 
disbursements (constant 2008 US$ million).  OECD (2010) 
TradeFacilitation  Cumulative Aid for Trade Facilitation, gross disbursements 
(constant 2008 US$ million).  OECD (2010) 
CostExp  Cost associated with exporting a 20-foot container in US$, 
deflated using the US Consumer Price Index.  World Bank (2010a) 
CostImp  Cost associated with importing a 20-foot container in US$, 
deflated using the US Consumer Price Index.  World Bank (2010a) 
TimeExp  Time necessary to comply with all procedures required to 
export a 20-foot container in days.  World Bank (2010a) 
TimeImp  Time necessary to comply with all procedures required to 
import a 20-foot container in days.  World Bank (2010a) 
Trade  Value of merchandise trade (exports and imports) in billion 
US$, deflated using the US Consumer Price Index.  UNCTAD (2009a) 
GDPpc  GDP per capita (constant 1990 US$).  UNCTAD (2009a) 
FuelPrice  The pump price for diesel fuel in US$ per liter, deflated 
using the US Consumer Price Index.  World Bank (2010b) 
RegQuality 
Regulatory quality measures the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations, 
ranging from -2.5 to +2.5, where higher figures represent 
better governance. 
World Bank (2010c) 
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Appendix  B:  Descriptive  Statistics  for  the  Total  Sample,  LDC  Sample  and  Top  20 
Sample 
Total sample 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
AfT  396  373.39  604.03  2.23  4,895.33 
TradePolicy  391  8.91  26.29  0  302.59 
TradeFacilitation  326  1.16  2.89  0  36 
CostExp  396  1,443.37  852.76  390  5,293.77 
CostImp  396  1,723.07  1,053.11  385  5,922.63 
TimeExp  488  31.67  16.77  9  89 
TimeImp  488  36.97  20.04  9  104 
Trade  495  62.91  205.01  0.17  2,466.92 
GDPpc  495  1,676.53  1,924.47  102.81  10,505.13 
FuelPrice  488   0. 71  0.33  0.01  1.73 
RegQuality  495  -0.42  0.6  -2.13  1.58 
Sample LDC 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
AfT  132  348.98  417.64  2.28  2,104.73 
TradePolicy  132  7.24  13.76         0   106.8 
TradeFacilitation  107  0.75  1.4  0  9.28 
Sample TOP 20 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
AfT  80  1,174.16  933.42    144.41    4,895.33 
TradePolicy  79  29.73     53.05    .06    302.59 
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Appendix C: Country Sample 
 
Table C.1: Total Country Sample  
 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Cambodia,  Cameroon,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Chile,  China, 
Colombia, Rep. of Congo, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Macedonia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, 
Pakistan,  Panama,  Papua  New  Guinea,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Philippines,  Rwanda,  Saudi  Arabia,  Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, 
Yemen, Zambia. 
 
Note: Countries in italics are not included in the sample for TradeFacilitation. Countries in bold are LDCs.  
 
 
Table C.2: Top 20 Recipients According to Aid Category 
 Top 20 Recipients for TradeFacilitation (cumulative disbursements 2006-2008) 
Egypt, Dominican Republic, Ukraine, Mali, Jordan, Guatemala, Pakistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Albania, 
Moldova,  Viet  Nam,  Lesotho,  Madagascar,  Kenya,  Mozambique,  Peru,  Armenia,  Kyrgyz  Republic, 
Honduras. 
 
 Top 20 Recipients for TradePolicy (cumulative disbursements 2006-2008) 
Egypt,  Bangladesh,  Burundi,  Viet  Nam,  Burkina  Faso,  Jordan,  China,  Tanzania,  Kenya,  Senegal, 
Indonesia, Dominican Republic, Mozambique, Cote d'Ivoire, South Africa, Uganda, Cambodia, Ukraine, 
India, Mali. 
 
Top 20 Recipients for AfT (cumulative disbursements 2006-2008) 
India,  Viet  Nam,  Indonesia,  China,  Turkey,  Egypt,  Ethiopia,  Bangladesh,  Philippines,  Tanzania, 
Morocco, Uganda, Pakistan, Mozambique, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria. 
 
Note: Countries in bold are LDCs. 
 
 